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Lifting Printz Off Dual Sovereignty: 
Back to a Functional Test for the Etiquette of Federalism 
Alfred R. Ligh( 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, the Supreme Court revived constitutional federalism in Na-
tional League of Cities. 1 In 1985, the Court overruled that decision. 2 In 
the 1990s, however, the United States Supreme Court once again resur-
rected constitutional federalism, but this time, however, in a different 
form- the "etiquette of federalism."' In New York v. United States, the 
Court held that the federal government lacked authority to "compel the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."4 In Printz v. 
United States, the Court went further to hold that "Congress cannot cir-
cumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly."1 
Ruling that "the Framers rejected the concept of a central government 
that would act upon and through the States,"6 the Court found unconstitu-
tional provisions of the Brady Act requiring local law enforcement offi-
cers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 7 
Where the national government issues a command directing a state 
official to enact or implement a certain policy, the command is ineffec-
tive because it is unconstitutional. In Printz, the Court concluded that its 
determinations as to whether such a command offends state sovereignty is 
not subject to any sort of balancing test. 8 The etiquette of federalism is 
* Copyright <D 1'198 by Alfred R. Light. Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School 
of Law, Miami, Florida. J.D. Harvard University; Ph.D. University of North Carolina; B.A. The 
Johns Hopkins University. 
I Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 ( 1976) 
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth, 469 U.S. 528 ( 1985). 
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J, concurring). 
4. 505 US. 144, 188 (1992) 
5 117 S Ct. 2365, 2384 ( 1997) [hereinafter Printz]. 
6. 117 S. Ct. at 2377. 
7 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. I 03-159. I 07 Stat. I '136 ( 1'!'!6) 
S The Court held: 
[t]he whole ob;ed of the law to direct the functioning of the state 
executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual 
sovereignty, such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate. It is the very 
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no 
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violated even though the command is formally directed to a state official 
rather than a state and whatever the reasons the state official may have 
not to follow the command.9 It is violated even though the command 
merely directs the performance of enforcement or ministerial obligations 
as opposed to policy. 10 Because of its categorical nature, the Printz 
Court's doctrine of dual sovereignty has arbitrary parameters. 11 This na-
ture contrasts sharply with other doctrinal areas of Supreme Court juris-
prudence involving federal-state relations. 
Decided in the summer of 1997, Printz spurred extensive commen-
tary, both in anticipation of and in reaction to the Supreme Court deci-
sion. Derided as "antinationalist" 12 and "anti-federalist," 11 some observers 
even detected a retum to the antebellum philosophy of John C. Calhoun. 1 ~ 
There have been attacks on the Court's methodology, its "doctrinal for-
malism,"1' as well as its policy objectives. 16 Even those who defend the 
comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that 
fundamental defect. 
Prin1:. 117 S. Ct. at 23S3. 
'J Prrnlz.. 117 S Ct. a! 2182 (maJority), 2399 (dissent). 
I 0. Sec in/1-o notes n-~2 and accompanying text. 
II Profe"or Chemerinsky recently termed the Supreme Court's approach in th" area as 
"formalistic" 1n contrast to "functional." Erwin Chemcrinsky, Formalism and Funi"lronalrsm 111 
Federalism i\r11rlvsis. IJ GA. ST U L REV. 95') ( l'l'J7). Though Professor Chemerinsky 111 my view 
does not provide sufficient countenance to the Supreme Court policies which underlie its "an!J· 
conscription" doctrine, essentially we complain about the same phenomenon. He complains that 
the Supreme Court has no "justification as to the constitutional hasis" for its new 1Cderalisn1 
policies. The prohlern is that the Court uses its policies to justify its constJtutJOnal theory while 
failing to assess the policies in the context of the particular statute it is evaluating. See !llso Erwin 
Chcmennsky. The Values of Federalism, 47 U. FIA L REV. 499 ( 1995). The Harvard Law Review 
s11ndarly complains of Pwr!~'s "bright-line rule, the parameters of which remain unspecified." 
Note. Federalism · Com{'elling S/({/e Ofjinals to Fnjiiln' Federal Regulmon· Reg11ncs. Ill H,\RV. 
L REV 207 (I'J'J7) 
12 Evan H. Camicker, f'rinl.", Slir!<' Sovertignn·. and tire IAmi/.1 of Fonwrlrsnr. 19')7 Sl P 
Ci R1:v 19'). 200, 248 (19'J7J 
1.1. John E. Nowak, Federaliw1 and lire Civrl War i\nrendmen/.1. 23 01110 N.U L RlcV 
1209. 1235 (1997) 
14. Bernard Schwartz, A Presidenlial Strikeout, Federalism. RFR;\, S!ond11rg. and S!tal!h 
Courl, :n Tt'LSA L J. 77, 81 (1997); cj: Nowak, supra note 13, at 1235. 
15. Camicker. supra note 12, at 20 I 
ln. E.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Poliliml Economy of Coopemlil'e Ferlerali.\rll Win· 
S!tl/e Au!onomv Makes Sense and "Dual Sm·ereigntv" !Joesn'l, 9() Mllll. L REV. 81.1 (I'J98) 
(Supreme Court needs to develop a principled intergovernmental relations and political economy 
rationale for its results in cases such as Prinlz. because the justifications for the national!stic dual 
federalism doctrine developed by the Marshall and Taney courts no longer exisl); Nell Kmkopf. 
Of /)n·olulion, Pril·itimlion, and Gloholwrtion: Sepormion of f'owers Limils on Congre.,·srontrl 
i\u!irorilr lo ;\ssign Federal l'm1er lo Non-Federal i\ctors, 'iO RUTCiLRS L. REv :n I I 1998) 
(Court's separation of powers doctrines do not supp011 Prinlz dictum establishing a flat prohibition 
on congressiOnal transfer of executive authority to a State); Evan H. Camicker, supra note 12. at 
247 ("But because Justice Scalia's opinion eschews explicit discussion of the nonnative values 
undcrlyi,1g various definitions of state sovereignty, he provides no clear guidance concermng why 
or how Important he believes it is to protect state autonomy."). 
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Court's holding rationalize the result with reference to constitutional doc-
trine or theory other than ones used by the Court. 17 Other commentary 
traces Printz's implications for specific regulatory areas. 1s 
Ironically, however, most commentary has not focused on Printz's 
novelty within the specific context of other constitutional doctrines ad-
dressing federal-state relations. 19 This article focuses precisely on how 
Printz stands out when compared to related federal-state doctrines articu-
lated by the Court. Part II opens this discussion by contrasting Printz's 
categorical test with balancing approaches used with respect to (I) Elev-
enth Amendment immunity of the States, (2) Erie-related doctrines re-
garding the application of federal law in state courts, (3) procedural due 
process applied to state governmental decisions, and (4) separation of 
powers jurisprudence. Part III briefly explores the historical underpin-
nings and functional justifications for Printz's "anti-conscription" doc-
trine. Finally, this article concludes that a balancing approach, akin to the 
parsing of national and state functions under earlier dual sovereignty doc-
trines, is more likely to detect situations which offend the core policies 
the Court is trying to protect (i.e. political accountability, preservation of 
liberty, cost internalization, and separation of powers) than the technical 
boundaries upon which the current Printz test turns. 
II. PRINTZ'S NOVELTY 
The parameters of the Supreme Court's newest doctrine of constitu-
tional federalism depart from those which the Court has developed in re-
lated areas of federal-state relations, such as Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, state court jurisdiction, procedural due process, and separation of 
powers cases. Printz prohibits injunction actions against state officials, 
though the Court's 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida 20 preserved such actions in the context of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity .21 Printz categorically refuses to compel state bureaucrats to 
17. See Hills. supra note 16, at 939 (seeking to justify the result in Prinrz with reference 
to the JUrisprudence of takings and free speech under the First and Fifth Amendments). 
18. Alfred R. Light, He Who Pavs the Piper Should Cull r!ze Tune. Dual Sm-ereignrv in 
U.S Envmmmental Law, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 779 (1998) (questioning the validity of provisions in 
federal environmental statutes): Jay T. Jorgensen, The Pracrical Power of Srore and Low/ 
Govemments to Enfi1rce Fedemllmmixration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV. 899, 925 (1997) (Attorney 
General could not, with the approval of a state agency head, simply override a lack of authority 
(or an express prohibition) in state law that limits the immigration enforcement functions that state 
and local officials may undertake). 
19. A notable exception in the separation of power area is Professor Neil Kinpopf, who has 
examined Prinrz's sharp contrast with the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence under the 
Appointments Clause. Kinpopf, supra note 16. 
20. 517 U S 44 ( 1996) [hereinafter Seminole]. 
21. See infi'o notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
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follow federally-mandated administrative procedures, though the Court, 
only two weeks before Printz was decided, had limited its refusal to com-
pel state courts to follow federal judicial procedure to situations where 
state procedures are based on neutral principlesY Printz refuses to com-
mand state compliance with federal statutory procedures where federal 
law controls the regulated citizens' rights and obligations, though the 
Court has long commanded state compliance with procedures required by 
constitutional due process, even for state administrative processes in 
which the regulated citizens' rights and obligations are governed by state 
law. 23 In addition, Printz enlists dual sovereignty to prohibit congressio-
nal transfer of the President's executive power to the States. 24 In separa-
tion of powers cases, however, the Court has sustained delegations of 
power to the other branches of the federal Government where there are 
adequate safeguards to cabin the delegated power and where encroach-
ment on Presidential prerogatives are not too severe. In contrast, Printz 
resolves its separation of powers concern through a categorical prohibi-
tion to foster a unitary Executive which clearly does not exist within the 
Federal establishment. 25 
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
The Printz Court found no constitutional significance in the fact that 
the statute at issue attempted to impose responsibility on state officials 
rather than the state itself, despite the principal dissent's adherence to 
Eleventh Amendment distinctions between states and state officials em-
bodied in Ex parte Young?" In Seminole, 27 decided the year prior to 
Printz, the Court had decided that Congress lacks authority to abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States through exercise of its 
Commerce Power. The Court indicated there, however, that citizens 
could continue under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young to seek prospective 
injunctive relief from state officials violating federal law.28 
22. Johnson v. Fankell. 117 S. Ct. 1800. 1807 (1997): see infra notes 37-59 and 
accompanying text; Evan H. Camicker, State Sovereixnty and Subordinacr: Mav Con;;ress 
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law:' 95 COLUM. L. REV. I 00 I, I 023 n.SH 
(1995) ("For such procedural requirements to be valid, they must be nondiscriminatory with respect 
to the source of the defense (both by their terms and as applied) and must be supported by a 
legitimate and sufficiently strong state interest."); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of 
Federal Rixhts, 99 HARV. L REV. 1128 ( 1986). 
23. See infra notes 60-67 ;md accompanying text. 
24. 117 S. Ct. 2365, at 2367; see infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
25. See mf'ra notes 68-82 and accompanying text. 
26. 117 S. Ct. at 2382 (rnajonty), 2399 (dissent). 
27. 517 U.S 44 (1996) 
28. 517 U.S. at 71 n.14, 72 n.l6. Since the statute provided for remedies against a state 
official less than the full remedial powers of the federal court, including contempt, which Ex Parte 
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In the principal dissent in Printz, Justice Stevens notes the "consider-
able tension" between the majority's holding and the Court's "Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity cases."29 Stevens indicates that a consti-
tutional distinction between States, entitled to sovereign immunity, and 
local officials (such as the officials instructed to implement the Brady 
regime), not entitled to sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amendment 
principles, should apply. 30 Again, however, the Court's majority rejected 
the dissent's invitation to import such a distinction into its "anti-conscrip-
tion" analysis, finding the "Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence" of "no 
relevance." 31 
The ex parte Young "fiction" is a long-established principle intended 
to prevent states from subverting the Supremacy Clause through immu-
nity from judicial orders to comply with federal law.32 Commentators 
note its "evident necessity ."33 Printz's refusal to honor its distinctions, 
between the state and a state's official and between retroactive sanctions 
and prospective injunctive relief, undermines the Ex parte Young doctrine 
by providing an additional and separate means for acquiescing in state 
departures from statutory or constitutional mandates. The Ex parte 
Young doctrine has internal limits. The doctrine does not permit the re-
covery of money from a state even where a state official rather than the 
Young would authorize, the Court read the statute to preclude an Ex Parte Young action against 
a state official. 517 U.S at 74. ("[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for 
the enforcement against a state of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting 
aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte 
Young"). In a somewhat similar context, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 not to support 
actions against state officials on the grounds that a suit against a state official is tantamount to a 
suit agamst the official's office. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 
( 1989 ). Again in an important footnote, the Court distinguished suits seeking prospective relief 
because "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be 
a person under § 1983 because personal-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as 
actions against the State." 491 U.S at 71 n.IO (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 
n.14 ( 1985)). Some have suggested that this hyper-technical distinction in 1988 signaled the 
Court's paving the way for undermining the Ex Parte Young "fiction." Vicki C. Jackson, One 
Hundred Years of' Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L REV. 51, 
99 ( 1990) While this author finds this prospect remote, Jackson finds it more plausible that the 
Court might extend Eleventh Amendment protection to actions against state officials for structural 
relief to the extent those actions cannot, in the Court's view, be assimilated to common law writs 
against individual officials. /d. at 104 n.l97. It is possible that Printz does this by adding to a 
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity a State official's implied immunity to compel prospective 
inJunctive relief under federal law in situations where the actions sought are acts of the State 
official in his official rather than personal capacity. 
29. 117 S. Ct. at 2394 n.l6. 
30. 117 S. Ct. at 2399. 
31. 117 S Ct. at 2382 n.l5. 
32. See John E. Nowak, The Scope of' Conxressional Power to Create Causes of' Action 
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 
COLliM. L REV. 1413, 1445-46, 1455-58 (1975). 
33. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-27 at 191 (2d ed. 1988) 
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state itself is the named party. 34 The exception to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity also does not apply to retroactive, as opposed to prospective, 
relief in which a plaintiff seeks relief with respect to a state or state offi-
cial's past behavior, such as damages, compensation, or an injunction 
directed at undoing a completed transaction. The Court recently acknowl-
edged that the doctrine "is an exercise in line-drawing" that must "reflect 
the real interests of States" based on a case-by-case inquiry into a state's 
"special sovereignty interests."35 Printz undermines these distinctions by 
establishing a separate constitutional federalism doctrine which ignores 
the state vs. state official and retroactive/prospective distinctions and 
which refuses to engage in a case-by-case balancing in deciding whether 
to require state participation in a congressional regulatory scheme. 1" 
B. Erie and Related Doctrines 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is not the only related area of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence which the Printz court has ignored and may 
undermine. The issue of the extent to which the Government can require 
the States to follow specific procedures in support of federal statutory 
objectives is reminiscent of long-standing problems associated with ap-
plication of the Erie doctrine. Erie requires federal courts to apply state 
law in adjudicating common law causes of action heard under the federal 
courts' diversity jurisdiction.37 In Hanna v. Plumer, 3x the Supreme Court 
found that federal courts did not have to apply state judicial procedures in 
diversity cases even though state substantive law must apply under the 
Erie doctrine. Instead, the federal courts could follow the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The obverse of Hanna is the issue of whether a state 
court adjudicating a federal cause of action may follow its own proce-
dures when they differ from those which a federal court would follow had 
the claim been brought there. 39 In Felder v. Casey, 40 the Court required 
state courts to follow federal procedure in adjudicating federal claims 
under Section 1983. In her dissent in Felder, Justice O'Connor com-
34. Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651. 663 (1974). 
35. Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe. 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2039-40 ( 1997). 
36. For example, the doctrine may complicate the use of citizen enforcement stuts m 
environmental law. See Light, supra note 18, at 817-23. 
37. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938). 
38. 380 U.S 460 ( 1965). 
39. For example, in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S 131 (1988), a Wisconsin court attempted to 
apply a state statute which required notification of a state or local governmental entity or officer 
within 120 days of the injury to a civil rights claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S C. ~ 1983 ( 1997 J 
The Court held that the state notice provision was "patently incompatible with the compensatory 
goals of the federal legislation" and refused to permit the state to use its procedures in adjudicating 
the federal claim. !d. at 143. 
40. 487 us. 131 (1988) 
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plained that the Court had refused to allow state courts to follow their 
own procedures because of "a sort of upside-down theory of federalism" 
or a "'reverse-Erie' theory ."41 State substantive law may not trump fed-
eral procedures under Hanna, but federal substantive law might trump 
state procedure under Felder. 42 
Concurrent with the Printz case in 1997, however, the Court reached 
a result in favor of state procedural primacy in a suit adjudicating federal 
statutory rights. In Johnson v. Fankell,43 an Idaho trial court denied sum-
mary judgment on several officials' qualified immunity defense under 
Section 1983. The officials appealed, but the Idaho Supreme Court dis-
missed. The United States Supreme Court held that even though the offi-
cials would have had a right to immediate appeal had their action been 
brought in federal court, the state courts did not have to provide a similar 
right within their state court systems. Quoting dictum from its earlier case 
of H(ndett v. Rose44 at length, Justice Stevens writing for a unanimous 
Court emphasized the Court's reluctance to obligate a state court to enter-
tain a federal claim "when [the] state court refuses jurisdiction because of 
a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts."4 ' In 
Fankell. the Court distinguished Felder on the grounds that in Fankell 
application of the state rule of procedure would not necessarily "produce 
a final result different from what a federal ruling would produce," and 
that the right of appeal under federal law did not have as its source the 
substantive federal law provision Section 1983 but rather the procedural 
federal law provision Section 1291.46 
-1 I 487 U S at 161 (O'Connor. J . dissenting). 
-12 For example. qatc courts must forego their generally applicahk noticc~of~actlon 
reqlllremcnts and awards of pre~judgment interest in the context of state court adjudicat1on of 
federal statutory rights. Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan. 48(> U.S .. no ( !'!881. 
4.3 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1'!97). 
-1-1 4% US ]56 (llJlJO). 
-1'i. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800. IXO'i ( 19'!7) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U S 
3)6, .\72 ( 1990)) 
46. 117 S. Ct. at 1806. In the course of its analysis, the Court found relevant its rat10nale 
in a somewhat different Sect10n 198] case, Johnson v. Jones, 505 U.S. 304 ( 1995). In that case, 
the Court considered claims of government officials that they were entitled to an immediate appeal 
from an order denying them summary judgment on the ground that the record showed a genuine 
issue of matetial fact whether the off1cials had enlia!ied in conduct that constituted a ckar violation 
of constitutional law. The Court in Johnson upheld the order. distinguishing its em·Jier case of 
idllche/1 ,. Forsrth, 472 U.S. 511 ( 19X5). in which the Court endorsed an immediate appeal on 
the issue of whether the facts shm1·ed a l'io!ation of clearly established law. The Court explained 
that in Johnson the court had found the "strong 'countervailing considerations' surrounding 
appropriate interpretation of ~ 129 I" to be "of sufficient importance to outweigh the officials· 
interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation." Johnson v. Fankcll, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1807 (1'!97). 
Similarly, in Johnson 1·. Fanke/1, the Court found strong "countervailing considerations" in the 
need to respect a State courts' "conSistent application of its neutral procedural rules" to a federal 
hm requinng "a State to undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its 
courts." /d. 
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The balancing approach elaborated in Fankell acknowledges a sort of 
"Converse-Hanna" doctrine for state judges. The doctrine looks to factors 
like those which have guided the Erie doctrine over the years, such as the 
relation of procedure and substance, outcome determination, and the bal-
ancing of state and federal interests.47 Its analytical balancing approach, 
like the Ex parte Young doctrine, thus contrasts with Printz's categorical 
"anti-conscription" principle for state law enforcement officials. 
In Printz, the Government found relevance in principles requiring 
state courts to hear claims under federal law, citing the landmark decision 
of Testa v. Katt. 48 Testa requires state courts to adjudicate claims arising 
under federal law where the state courts have adequate jurisdiction over 
similar claims under state and locallaw.49 Like Fankell, Testa embodies a 
nondiscrimination principle. States may deny a forum to hear federal 
claims only where they decline to hear analogous state law claims. 50 But 
the Court rejected the Government's argument and distinguished the case, 
explaining, "Testa stands for the proposition that state courts cannot re-
fuse to apply federal law - a conclusion mandated by the terms of the 
Supremacy Clause."51 
The Printz Court found Testa not relevant because of (I) the text of 
the Constitution binding "the Judges in every State" to federal law in a 
context where lower federal courts might not even be established,52 (2) 
the distinctive nature of courts where "unlike legislatures and executives, 
they applied the law of other sovereigns all the time,"53 and (3) the dis-
tinctiveness of recent cases allowing Congress to require "state adminis-
trative agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity." 5~ 
The Court concluded that cases discussing state court obligations were 
irrelevant because it viewed the obligations of state administrators under 
Brady to be "non adjudicative responsibilities of the state agency." 55 Re 
47. Cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 ( 1945) (outcome determinative test under 
Erie); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 ( 195X) (balancing test 
under Erie); Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown R.R., 342 US 359 ( 1952) (balancing of state 
federal interests to decide right to trial by jury in state court under federal cause of actton) 
48. 117 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 3S6 ( 1947)). 
49. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 773 n.4 (I n2) (Powell. J , concurnng and 
dissenting). 
50. /d., citing Note, Utilization of' State Courts to Enfi~rce Federal Penal and Cnnunal 
Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Tcsw 
upsets "the traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sovereign right to 
determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its own courts"). /d. 
51. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381 
52. 117 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl 2) 
53. !d. 
54. 117 S. Ct. at 2381 (interpreting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-771 & n.24 
(1982)) 
55. 117 S. Ct. at 2382 n.l4. Justice Stevens, the author of the unanimous opmion in 
Fanke/1, wrote the principal dissent in Printz. As one might expect, Stevens dispatches the 
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jection of congressional requirements that States comply tn an adminis-
trative context was categorical. ' 6 
Despite the debate in Printz over Testa, neither the Court nor Justice 
Steven's dissent makes reference to Fankell decided two weeks earlier. 
Instead of resting his Printz dissent on the grounds that the state's refusal 
to implement the Brady Act was not based on "neutral procedural rules," 
Justice Stevens endorses less cabined congressional discretion to appraise 
"the interests of cooperative federalism" and "its own constitutional 
power" and to decide whether to enlist the States in lieu of "an enlarged 
federal bureaucracy."57 Both the majority and Justice Stevens adopt 
bright-line rules. The majority holds that Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program by conscripting 
state officers directly. 5x Stevens would defer to Congress as to such mat-
ters.)'' Erie-like cases suggest a more even-handed approach in which the 
majority"s categorical distinction of judicial and other capacities in which state administrators act. 
117 S Ct. at 2400-2401 (Stevens. J. dissenting). Stevens sees the majority's reliance on the text 
of the Supremacy Clause as "misguided" because the Clause is not the source of the state judge's 
"duty to accept jurisdiction of federal claims that they would prefer to ignore." 117 S Ct. at 2400. 
Instead, the Clause is direct to the matter of what law applies in cases properly before a state 
court. Moreover, he rejects the majmity's implicit eXJJressio unius argument that the Constitution's 
endorsement of requiring state judges to enforce federal law implies no similar obligation for other 
state officials. !d. 
56. In rejecting the Government's arguments that the Court should examine the burdcm and 
benefits of requiring state implementation, the Court explains: 
Assuming all the mentioned factors were true, they might he relevant if Wt: were 
evaluating whether the Incidental application to the States of a federal law of general 
applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of state governments But 
where, as here, it 1s the whole ohject of the law to direct the functioning of the slat<: 
executive, and henct: to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, such 
a 'balancing' analysis in inapproptiatc. It is the very Jirinciple of separate slate sovt:rcignty 
that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can 
overcome that fundamental defect. 
117 S.Ct. at 2383. 
57. 117 S. Ct. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58. 117 S. Ct. at 2384. 
59. That Stevens disagrees with the general notion that Congress cannot force States to 
implement federal regulations is apparent throughout his dissent. 117 S. Ct. at 2390 ("[S]tale 
judiCial and executive branch ofllcials may he required to implement federal law where the 
National Government acts within the scope of its afllnnativc powers."); 117 S. Ct. :11 2.195 
("[ U]nelected JUdges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in 
all but the most extraordinary circurmtances"); 117 S. Ct. at 2398 ("The majority relics upon 
dictum in New York to the effect that '[t]he Federal Government may not compel States to enact 
or administer a federal regulatory program.' But that language was wholly unnecessary to the 
decision of the case."). Other than a backhand salute to a princtple he traces to Notionol Leuxue 
of C11ies that there may he a constituiJOnally-signiticant distinction between a command to "States 
as States" to enact legislation and a command to state ofllcials to assist the Federal government, 
Stevens disclanns a JUdicial role in regulating congrt:ssional cnlistmc:nl of the States. 117 S Ct 
at 239X. 
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Court would balance substantive federal policies against state administra-
tive burdens in order to resolve the matter on a case-by-case basis. 
C. Procedural Due Process 
Printz's rejection of a balancing approach also implicates the Court's 
principles of procedural due process. The procedural due process explo-
sion of the 1970's arose in the context of individuals seeking entitlements 
from the federal largess, in landmark cases such as Goldberg v. Keflv00 
and Mathews v. Eldridge. 61 In this area of constitutional law, the Court 
also balances interests of affected citizens and the Government to deter-
mine how much process is due in administrative decisions. 62 
In procedural due process jurisprudence, the choice as to whether a 
state creates an "entitlement" or other constitutionally-protected interest 
belongs to the state. Federal due process protections under the Fourteenth 
Amendment critically depend upon the state's view of its own law.(d But 
once rights and obligations under state law are established, the state's 
administrative and judicial processes must meet federal constitutional 
requirements. 64 For example, a state may choose to operate or not to oper-
ate prisons. If they choose to operate prisons, however, they must meet 
constitutional-required minimum standards. 61 
In Printz, the Court refused to require a state or its officials to support 
the federal interest in gun registration in the context of the state's law 
enforcement regime. It refused despite the expression of that federal in-
terest in a federal statute validly enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause. As Justice Stevens' dissent points out, Printz eliminates the Hob-
son's Choice logic of PERC v. Mississippi under which a state must regu-
60. ~97 u s 254 ( 1970) 
61. 424 US. 31'! (1976) 
62. These principles apply in the context of a regulatory regime. For example. Ill Hrod 1 
Rai!ll'a\" E.tpre.Is. Inc.. 481 U.S. 252 (I <J87). a federal agency adnunistcrcd a regime regulating 
commercial motor transportation. including protection of employees of companies who refuse to 
operate a motor vehicle that docs not comply with applicable qatc and federal safety regulations 
The Court found that the failure of the federal agency's administrative process to inform the 
employer of the relevant evidence before temporary reinstatement of an employee deprived the 
employer of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. 
63. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudcnnill. 470 U.S. 532. 53X-3<J ( l'!X5) (property 
intcre,tl. cert. denied after remand. 4XX US. 946 (I <JH8); Hewitt v. Helm'. 45<J US 460. 466-6 7 
(ln3) (liberty interest); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co .. 455 US 422. 431-33 (19X2); Paul v 
Davis. 424 U.S. 693. 708-09 (I <J76); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564. 576-77 (I '!72) 
64. This is the central message of Loudnmil/"s rejection of Justice Rehnquist's "bitter wilh 
the sweet" approach. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudennill. 470 U S. 532, 541 (I <J85) ( .. The point 
is straight forward: the Due Process Clause provides that ccr1ain substantive nghts-lifc. liberty, 
and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The 
catcgones of substance and procedure arc distinct."). 
65. See Welsh v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122. 1132 n.R (8th Cir 1977) 
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late under federal standards or choose not to continue to regulate at all. 66 
Printz contrasts sharply with the procedural due process cases. Due Pro-
cess requires that a state conform its regulatory processes to Federal min-
imum procedural requirements mandated by the courts, notwithstanding 
the state's control over creation or elimination of the "property" sub-
jected to the procedural requirements. Printz, however, simply permits a 
state to refuse to participate in Federal regulatory processes mandated by 
the Congress, notwithstanding the state's ongoing institutions operating 
pursuant to state procedure in an overlapping area logically related to the 
Federal substantive regulation. 67 Without sanction, the States may do 
nothing. 
o6. I 17 S Ct. at 23'!'! ("In FERC, we upheld a federal statute requiring state utilities 
commissions, inter alia, to take the affirmative step of considering federal energy standards in a 
manner complying with federally specified notice and comment procedures, and to report back to 
Congre" periodically." The Court continued, "the state commissions could avotd this obligation 
only by ceasing regulation in the field, a 'choice' that we recognized was realisttcally foreclosed, 
since Congress had put forward no altemative regulatory scheme to govern this very important 
area."). The Printz Court's attempt to distinguish FERC is altogether unconvincing. Justice 
Rehnquist writes that in FERC the Court had "upheld the statutory provisions at issue precisely 
because they dtd not commandeer state government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued 
state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted ticld." 117 S. Ct. at 23~ I The Court also makes 
reference to Hodel \'. Virglllia Surji1ce Mining & Reclwnation Assn., Inc., 4.~2 li.S. 264 (I 'JX I), 
hut unlike FFRC, the regulatory regime considered in Hodel placed "the full regulatory burden" 
on the Federal Government m the event that a state chose not to cooperate in regulation. 452 U.S. 
204, 2X~. No such alternative existed in FERC. 
The d1"entmg opinions in FERC arc far more telling. Justice Powell argued in his partial 
dissent in FERC that the statute involved there violated the Tenth Amendment to the extent that 
it "prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that States must follow in deciding whether 
to adopt the proposed standards." 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell found 
FERC particularly offensive to state sovereignty in its provision for judicial review of state 
decisions at the instance of the Federal Government or "any person" under the statute's citizen 
cnf(Jrcemcnt suit provision. 456 U.S. at 772-73 (Powell, J., dissenting). He found Testa not to the 
contrary because of Testo's recognition that "Congress must respect the state institution's own 
decisionmaking structure and method." 451) U.S. at 773 n.4 (Powell. J .. dissenting). Instead, he 
found 'li•sto\ general principal that the Congress must take the state courts as it finds them fully 
applicable "to other organs of state government." 456 U.S. at 774. Justice O'Connor's dissenting 
opimon in FERC, while more provocative and wide-ranging, is consistent with Justice Powell's. 
456 U.S. at 783 (O'Connor, J., dissentmg) t"[T[here is nothing 'cooperative' about a federal 
program that compels state agencies either to function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal 
Government or to abandon regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to state authority."). 
In Print:, the tnajority essentially adopts the FERC dissenters· views. 
6 7. Under FFRC, a state had to abandon public utility regulation, a matter upon which the 
Federal government had no intention of offering a federal alternative regulatory system, in order 
to a\<lld doing the Congress' btdding on specific issues of federal interest. Under f'wll?, a state 
need not abandon local law enforcement, a matter upon which the Federal government has no 
intention of offering a federal altemative regulatory system, in order to avoid dotng the Congrc"' 
bidding un specific Issues of federal Interest. 
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D. Separation of Powers 
The "anti-conscription" principle also implicates the Supreme 
Court's balancing principles governing separation of powers and the dele-
gation doctrine. Viewed through the anti-delegation or separation of pow-
ers lens, the Printz question may be recast as whether and to what extent 
the President's executive power to implement or enforce federal law can 
be conferred or transferred to the States. The majority's practical separa-
tion of powers concern is that conscription of the States encroaches upon 
the prerogatives of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The 
congressional vesting of executive power in the States or their officials, 
which are not subject to the direct supervisory control of the President. 
presents the same sort of separation of powers concerns as creation of 
agencies within the Federal Government not subject to Presidential direc-
tion or congressional structures that avoid the Constitution's assignment 
of specific responsibilities to the Executive Branch.6x 
In this respect, attempted congressional transfer of the President's 
authority to implement, or "execute" to use the Article II term, resembles 
other congressional attempts to avoid Presidential prerogatives to prepare 
the budget,69 to obtain confidential advice regarding appointments, 70 or to 
veto legislation presented to him in the constitutionally prescribed man-
ner.71 The "anti-conscription" principle thus serves the function ''to en-
sure that Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the 
'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article II."72 In this sense, the 
Brady law resembles the unconstitutional Gramm-Rudman regime of 
Bmt·sher v. Synar, where Congress attempted "to grant to an officer under 
its control what it does not possess," the President's executive power. 73 It 
is unlike the independent counsel approved in Morrison v. Olson because 
the President may not remove the state and local law enforcement offi-
cials charged to administer the provisions of the Brady law. Justice Seal ia 
insists in Printz that the Framers sought " unity in the Federal Execu-
tive- to insure both vigor and accountability."74 He concludes: "That 
68. A note in the Harvard L1w Review in the early e1ghties saw federal cklegat!on ol 
administrative obligations to the States to "constitute an improper delegation of federal power llr 
a violation of the due process of lawmaking." Note. Tenrh Amendmenl. 96 flAR\i L REV. I'! I n 12 
( 1982) 
69. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S 714 (1986). 
70. Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 US 440. 467 ( 1'!89) (Kennedy. 
J .. concurring). 
71. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S 919 (1983) 
72. Morrison v. Olson. 487 US. 654. 658 ( 1988). 
73. Bowsher. 478 U.S. 714. 726 (1986) 
74. 117 S Ct. at 237X 
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unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject 
to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as 
with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its law."75 
Justice Scalia in Printz also complains, that in delegating enforce-
ment authority to the States, Congress of necessity delegates discretion to 
act or not to act. For example, a law enforcement official charged with 
administration of the Brady law must interpret what "reasonable efforts" 
must be made to conduct background checks and, as a consequence, de-
cide what priority to give the congressionally mandated tasks with respect 
to personnel and time vis a vis other responsibilities. 76 In explaining the 
need for a categorical prohibition on congressional transfers of executive 
power to the States, Printz questions distinctions made in the Govern-
ment's brief between "making" law or "policymaking," and "enforcing" 
law or "implementation." Scalia sees this line as similar to the distinction 
of "proper congressional conferral of Executive power from unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority for separation-of-powers pur-
poses."77 "Executive action that has utterly no policymaking component 
is rare," he opines and concludes that "an imprecise barrier against fed-
eral intrusion ... upon state authority is not likely to be an effective 
one."n In any event, he fails to see how permitting Congress to "dra-
goon" the States to "enforce" federal law because the Brady law "leaves 
no 'policymaking' discretion with the States" or "improves rather than 
worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty."79 
Distinctions between policymaking and implementation or 
enforcement, however, have long been a subject of Supreme Court con-
cern in the interpretation of important federal statutes. For example, un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Government may not be sued when 
75. !d. Professor Camicker has criticized this aspect of Printz. Evan H. Camicker. The 
Unitarv t'xecuttve and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, JOn 
( 1'!97 J ("[ A]s a practtcal matter. presidential supervision of state officials cannot realistically secure 
the values of centralized authority that drive the unitary theory."). 
76. I 17 S. Ct. at 23R I 
77 !d. 
n M 
79 /d. That Justice Rehnquist concurs in Justice Scalia's opinion questioning the practicality 
of a workable anti-delegation doctrine amuses in light of his previous advocacy of resuiTecting such 
a doctrine in earlier Supreme Court decisions. E.g., Industrial Union AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum lnst. 44R US. 607. 675 (19RO) (Rehnquist, J .. concurring) ("I have no doubt that the 
proviston at issue, standing alone. would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations of 
legislative power."). Scalia also touches on the Court's recent separation of powers cases elsewhere. 
referring: to the Chadha legislative veto decision for the proposition that JUSt because recent 
Congresses have enacted many similar provisions does not mean that they all cannot he 
unconstitutional. 117 S. Ct. at 2376 ("The legislative veto, though enshrined in perhaps hundreds 
of federal statutes, most of which were enacted in the 1970's and the earliest of which was enacted 
in 1'!32. was nonetheless held unconstitutional."). 
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its agents are performing discretionary functions_xo Non-discretionary or 
ministerial functions inadequately performed, however, can be the subject 
of damages action by those injured. Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, the Court has long distinguished two types of administrative discre-
tion, agency action "committed to agency discretion by law" not subject 
to judicial review at all because there is "no law to apply"xt and agency 
action reviewable to determine whether it should be overturned as arbi-
trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.x2 In Printz, however, Justice 
Scalia disclaims the practicality of determining whether state executive 
action has a sufficiently minor policymaking component so as to consti-
tute mere enforcement . The Court thus simply refuses, in the context of 
its dual sovereignty doctrine, to make the same sort of distinctions it fre-
quently has made elsewhere. 
XO. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 US. 315 ( 199 I) (challenged action of federal 
regulators involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of public policy goals and thus chums 
barred by the discretionary function exception); Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S 531 (I 988) 
(suit based on Government's licensing of an oral polio vaccine and on its subsequent approval of 
the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public not within discretionary function exception 
if government policy did not allow official who took the challenged action to release a 
noncomplying lot on the hasis of policy considerations); Dalehite v. United States, 346 US 15 
( 1953) (claims arising from massive explosion of fertilizer manufactured and prepared for export 
pursuant to federal program for increasing food supply in occupied areas after World War !I barred 
by discretionary function exception). 
81. Ex, Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S 182 ( 1993) (decisions about allocating funds from a 
Jump sum appropriation); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 ( 1988) (employment termination dccJsJons 
of the CIA director); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S 270, 282 ( I'JH7) (refusals to grant 
reconsideration of an action because of material error); Heckler v. Chancy, 470 US. S21 1 Jl)85J 
(decisions not to take enforcement action). The reviewability of the actions of an adrmnistrator turn 
on the nature of the action and the existence of a congressional standard by which to evaluate the 
action. In the absence of an express statutory standard, the decision of a prosecutor not to hnng 
an act1on or of a bureaucrat not to allocate funds to a program may not he r..:viewablc. CongreS' 
may. however. cabin the prosecutor's chscretion by specifying the criteria limiting his ability to 
decline prosecutiOn or the bureaucrat's discretion by specifying precisely how agency rnon1es may 
be spent. In the latter situation. agency actions or inactions may he overturned as "contrar; to 
law" 
R2. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 40 I U.S. 402 ( !l)7! ). Outside the context 
of statutory construction, the Court also has needed to distinguish ministenal from discrclionar; 
duties tclr the purpose of deciding whether an extraordinary writ of mandamus should issue. Th1s 
distinction goes hack at least as far as Marbury v. Madison, where Wilham Marbury sought ro 
compel Madison to deliver Marbury's commission as a justice of the peace. Chief Justice Marshall 
drew a sharp distinction between ministerial obligations whose fulfillment mandamus could compel 
and discretionary powers, with which the writ could not interfere. Mandamus sometimes seems to 
function much l1ke "abuse of discretion" review under the APA. See Work v. Rives, 267 US. 175 
(I 925). Other times a more orthodox view seems to prefer that mandamus lie only for breach of 
a "clear, non-discretionary duty." Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984) But the Court always 
has acknowledged that a line must be drawn. 
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III. BACK TO A FUNCTIONAL TEST FOR DUAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Printz.' s rhetoric makes reference to a number of policy concerns 
which motivate dual sovereignty, including political accountability,R3 
preservation of liberty,R4 and internalization of costs.w; Though the Court 
describes these functions in its discussion of the historical origins of the 
dual sovereignty doctrine, its does not examine such concerns in its eval-
uation of the intergovernmental arrangement in Printz. Instead, the Court 
merely looked to see whether the Federal Government has sought to com-
pel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Because it 
did, the attempt failed. 86 The Court should not have abandoned the analyt-
ical methods it has used in other doctrinal areas in developing its eti-
quette of federalism. 
Even if every schoolchild learns the doctrine of dual sovereignty ,x7 
that term no where appears in the Constitution's text, and its origins can 
seem "mystical."88 Much of the Court's discussion in Printz. is devoted to 
an exploration of those origins. Printz's case for dual sovereignty rests 
primarily on a historical analysis of the Framing Period and an examina-
tion of the structure of the Constitution.89 This reliance probably is due in 
no small measure to the Jack of persuasiveness in its subsequent argument 
that "prior jurisprudence" of the Court commands its result. 90 
The Government argued in Printz that the Framers and early 
Congresses contemplated that the Federal Government would make use 
of the States to administer federal programs. This was in response to the 
Petitioner's claim that the practice was "until very recent years at least, 
unprecedented."91 What every schoolchild learns, according to the Court, 
is that citizens within the United States are subject to the laws of two sov-
X3. Printz. 117 S. Ct. at 2377 ("The Constitution thus contemplates that a State's 
government wtll represent and remain accountable to its own citizens."). 
X4. 117 S. Ct. at 2378 ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."). 
X5. 117 S. Ct. at 2382 ("By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of 
implementing a federal regulatory program. Members of Congress can take credit for 'solvmg' 
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal 
taxes."!. 
X6. 117 S. Ct. at 2383. 
87. See Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S 452. 457 (1991) (O'Connor, l). 
88. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742. 767 n.30 (19X2) ("For while Justice O'Connor 
articulates a view of state sovereignty that is almost mystical. she entirely fails to address our 
central point."). 
89. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369~2376 (discussion of the Framing Period); 117 S Ct. at 2376~ 
2379 (structure). 
90. Thts portion of the Court's analysis is found at 117 S.Ct at 2379~2383. Justice Stevens 
comments that "a neutral historian would have to conclude that the Court's discussion of history 
does not even begin to establish a prima facie case." 117 S Ct. at 2394 n.l5. 
91 117 S Ct. at 2370. 
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ereigns, a national government of enumerated powers and a state govern-
ment of a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty."92 The "Framers rejected 
the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the 
States, and instead designed a system in which the state and federal gov-
ernments would exercise concurrent authority over the people-who 
were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects of government.' ,q1 
In contrast to the Court's categorical test for detecting violations of 
the etiquette of federalism, its "rationale" for the doctrine has a functional 
basis. Dual sovereignty has two principal functions for state govern-
ments: to ensure that States "will represent and remain accountable to its 
own citizens"94 and to structure a protection of liberty to "reduce the risk 
of tyranny."95 The doctrine also serves to ensure the same two functions 
for the Federal government and protects the unitary nature of Executive 
power in the President. 96 
As DeTocqueville later emphasized, it was the Framers' "master 
stroke of policy" that "the Federal courts, acting in the name of the laws, 
should take cognizance only of parties in an individual capacity."97 
DeTocqueville himself was shocked how the "plain American" citizen: 
could distinguish with surprising facility the obligations created 
by the laws of Congress from those created by the laws of his 
own state, and who, after having discriminated between the mat-
ters which come under the cognizance of the Union and those 
which the local legislature is competent to regulate, could not 
point out the exact limit of the separate jurisdictions of the Fed-
eral courts and the tribunals of the state. 98 
Late eighteenth century foreign observers of American government 
expressed sentiments similar to those of DeTocqueville. Lord Bryce, 
92. 117 S Ct. at 2376 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed .. 1961 )). 
93. 117 S Ct. at 2377 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15. at I 09 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed .. 1961 )). 
94. 117 S. Ct. at 2377. Accountability in this sense would include attribution of the costs 
of government to the level responsible for setting policy. 
95. 117 S Ct. at 2378 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S. 452.458 (1991)) 
96. !d. 
97. DETOCQUEYILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 154. 
98. !d. at 173. DeTocqueville questioned whether such a system woulu work in other 
cultures, such as those in Mexico and Europe. For America, though, DcTocqucville saw the 
division as genius. The division of sovereignty meant that states had no "desire for aggrandisernent 
or the care of self-defense" and could concentrate instead on "internal improvements." /d. at 169. 
The happy state of affairs in America derived more from the absence of national interference with 
the "spirit of enterprise" and from the "limited and incomplete nature" of the Union rather than 
the presence of national power or leadership. /d. at 170. 
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writing in the 1880s, analogized the "American Union" to a "great fac-
tory, wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their revolving wheels 
apparently intermixed, their bands crossing one another, yet each set do-
ing its own work without touching or hampering the other."99 In 1871, the 
Supreme Court summarized the sentiment as follows: 
There are within the territorial limits of each State two 
governments, restricted in their sphere of action, but independent 
of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each 
has its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each 
has its own tribunals of enforcement. Neither government can 
intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference 
therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other. 100 
Print::., however, does not employ the eighteenth or nineteenth century 
modes of analysis in which the Supreme Court must determine the inter-
state and intrastate roles which this constitutional theory would assign to 
the national and state sovereignties separately. 
President Reagan suggested a somewhat similar political initiative 
during his administration to achieve what was called decongestion, a 
"major sorting out of functional responsibilities among the three levels of 
government." 101 Thus, in his 1982 State of the Union, Reagan sought a 
"trade" in which the national government would assume the costs of 
Medicaid and the states would accept responsibilities for food stamps and 
AFDC. By disclaiming the sorting of functions as part of its etiquette of 
federalism, the Printz. Court apparently would continue to leave such sort-
ing to the political process. The Court's eighteenth century political 
philosophy-based rationale, however, demands such an inquiry. 
The Court's partial revival of dual sovereignty to protect the structure 
of state government, but not its separate functions, seems all the more 
odd because of the majority's reliance on the actual operating structures 
of eighteenth century America to root its conclusion that state bureaucra-
cies may avoid national commands to action. DeTocqueville was struck 
in the nineteenth century by the apparent absence in America of govern-
ment "administration" as Europeans understood it. He remarked, 
"[n]othing is more striking to a European traveler in the United States 
than the absence of what we term the government, or the administration. 
99. JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH Jig (2d ed. 1891). 
100. Tarhel's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1872). See id. at 407 ("In their laws, and 
mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the other."). 
I() I ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN BRIEF- THE FEDERAL 
ROLF IN TilE FFDERAL SYSTEM THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH I (Dec. I nO). 
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Written laws exist in America, and one sees the daily execution of them, 
but although everything moves regularly, the mover can nowhere be dis-
covered."l(12 
Between 1976 and 1985, in National League of Cities and Garcia, 
the Supreme Court tried to assess the intrusiveness of specific federal 
laws on the operations of state government. The Tenth Amendment's 
guarantee of the state's independent sovereignty required then that the 
Court inquire into whether the law (I) regulated the "States as States;" 
(2) addressed matters that are "indisputably attributes of state sover-
eignty;" and (3) required state compliance in a manner that impaired a 
state's ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional func-
tions."101 The Court, or at least Justice Blackmun who had provided the 
fifth vote in National League r~f Cities, also balanced the federal interest 
against the impairment of state government wherever the three-part test 
was satisfied. 104 Professor Tribe has criticized the National League of 
Cities approach as "Talmudic parsing of traditional and non-traditional 
state functions." 105 Such parsing was, however, at the core of early Amer-
ica's doctrine of dual sovereignty. 106 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As we have described above, while purporting to rely on historical 
precedent, Printz ignores the constitutional separation of governmental 
functions so obviously a part of eighteenth-century doctrine and its twen-
tieth century analogue, National League of Cities. Instead of parsing 
interstate from intrastate responsibilities, the Printz Court distinguishes 
executive and adjudicative conscription and induced cooperation from 
unconstitutional coercion. The new distinctions preserve recent decisions 
and dictum in cases such as FERC v. Mississippi and New York v. United 
States. 107 Ironically, however, the Printz Court ignores the analytic frame-
102. DcTocquevillc, at 73. Thus, he perceived, "The adminiwativc power in the United 
States presents nothing either centralized or hierarchical in its constitution; this accounts for its 
passing unperceived. The power exists, but its representative is no where to be seen." !d. at 74. 
Obviously, by the 1930s, this had changed. But just as obviously it would have been difficult for 
DeTocqueville to have divined the extent to which national policy could be effectuated through 
state bureaucracy where so little state bureaucracy could be found. 
103. Ex, EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 US. 226 (1983); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1'181). 
104. FERC v. Mississippi. 456 U.S. 742, 763-64 n.28 ( 1982); Hodel v. VIrginia Surface 
Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 n.29; see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell. J., dissenting); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROT!INDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4 IO(d) (5th ed. 1995). 
105. LA\IRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW~ 5-22 at 396 (2d ed. 19H8) 
I 06. See supra notes 98-10 I and accompanying text. 
I 07. See supra notes 59. 66. 
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works the Court has used in other areas important to federal-state rela-
tions, e.g. Eleventh Amendment, Erie-related doctrines, due process, and 
separation of powers decisions, all of which provide criteria to delineate 
the more serious intrusions on state sovereignty. 
These criteria may include (I) the distinction between retroactive 
sanctions and prospective injunctive relief in the Eleventh Amendment 
cases, tox (2) the distinction between state procedures which appear dis-
criminatory or neutral with respect to a federal statute's legitimate sub-
stantive objectives in the converse-Erie cases, 109 (3) the distinction be-
tween state processes that meet and do not meet federal standards of pro-
cedural fairness in the due process cases, 110 and ( 4) the distinction of re-
gimes where congressional transfer of power "impermissibly threatens 
the institutional integrity" of other branches of the federal government in 
separation of powers cases. 111 The Court's criteria in each of these other 
areas of constitutional jurisprudence seem more likely to detect situations 
which offend the core policies dual sovereignty is said to protect (i.e. po-
litical accountability, preservation of liberty, cost internalization, separa-
tion of powers) than the technical boundaries, executive vs. adjudicative, 
coercive vs. voluntary, upon which the Printz analysis currently turns. 
Once the relevance of such policy lynchpins and analytical criteria is rec-
ognized, the Court should feel less reluctant to return to a balancing akin 
to that of National League of Cities, which Justice Rehnquist once confi-
dently declared would "in time again command the support of a majority 
of [the] Court." 112 
I 08. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
I 09. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
Ill. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text; see also CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
851 ( 1986) (examining "the extent to which a congressional decision to authorize the adjudication 
of Article III business in a non-Article Ill tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity 
of the Judicial Branch," rejecting "formalistic and unbending rules."). 
112. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tramit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J, 
dissenting). 
